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“Everything changes and nothing remains still.” We designed three implicit studies
to understand how people react or adapt to a rapidly changing world by testing
whether verbal probability is better in expressing changeable uncertainty while
numerical probability is better in expressing unchangeable uncertainty. We found
that the “verbal-changeable” combination in implicit tasks was more compatible
than the “numerical-changeable” combination. Furthermore, the “numerical-changeless”
combination was more compatible than the “verbal-changeless” combination. Thus, a
novel feature called “changeability” was proposed to describe the changeable nature
of verbal probability. However, numerical probability is a better carrier of changeless
uncertainty than verbal probability. These results extend the domain of probability
predictions and enrich our general understanding of communication with verbal and
numerical probabilities. Given that the world around us is constantly changing, this
“changeability” feature may play a major role in preparing for uncertainty.
Keywords: verbal probability, numerical probability, changeable uncertainty, unchangeable uncertainty,
changeability feature
INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty exists in many aspects of our daily lives; thus, we
use probability predictions to mitigate and prepare for uncer-
tain events. For example, we may wonder if air quality will be
acceptable tomorrow, if the stock market will continue to rise, if a
hurricane will occur in a specific place, etc. We need to be able to
predict the probability of uncertain events to guide our decisions.
Because perceptions of risk and uncertainty are affected by
individual’s worldview and experience (Fox and Irwin, 1998), pre-
dicting the likelihood of an event depends on how a person views
uncertainty. There are two views on uncertainty. One view indi-
cates that uncertainty is changeable, whereas the other view states
that uncertainty is predetermined and changeless. Both views can
be traced back to religious perspectives on destiny and life, includ-
ing Buddhism and Islam. Buddhism views life as a dynamic and
ever-changing process, in which beings experience a succession
of lifetimes as one of many possible life forms (Keown, 2000).
In this dynamic process, individuals’ fate changes according to
their karma (the actions or deeds conducted by an individual in
their life). Good karma leads to good fortune, while bad karma
results in bad fortune. “A butcher becomes a Buddha the moment
he drops his cleaver” is an example of Buddhism’s emphasis on
the changeable nature of uncertainty. In contrast, some groups
believe in the doctrine of predetermination. For example, the Al-
Jabriyyah sect of Islam believes that everything in the world is
preordained and nothing can happen unless permitted by Allah,
i.e., the fate of an individual has been predetermined and can-
not be changed by free will. Despite this belief, people will not
have knowledge about future events until such events occur. Thus,
even if our lives have been predetermined and are changeless, the
future is still uncertain.
In addition to religious perspectives, two views on uncertainty
can be found in two prediction theories: I Ching ( ) and mod-
ern probability theory. The I Ching, also known as the Book of
Changes, emphasizes the importance of predicting the future from
a changing perspective. The book discusses changes between yin
and yang; where yin becomes yang when yin reaches the extreme
and vice versa (Wei, 1939). According to this theory, everything
in the universe is changing. Thus, people should consider this
variability and not regard the outcomes of future events as unal-
terable when predicting the likelihood of events. For example,
the Jiji ( ) Hexagram in I Ching states that “a good beginning
may bring a bad ending” (Wang and Ren, 1993). This statement
denotes that an enterprise can begin with good fortune but end in
disaster, thus, situations change over time. Therefore, the uncer-
tainty implied by I Ching changes according to circumstances.
In contrast, modern probability theory, which is rooted in the
attempts of Gerolamo Cardano to analyze games of chance in
the sixteenth century, applies mathematical thinking to predic-
tion theory and assigns unchangeable predictions to uncertain
outcomes. Modern probability theory considers uncertain events
as random, exhibiting a sequence of certain patterns (e.g., the law
of large numbers) that can be predicted if repeated many times.
Thus, the potential outcomes of random events are limited to
mathematical laws and the likelihoods of such outcomes are sta-
tionary and fixed. For example, tossing a coin will result in one of
two equally possible outcomes: heads or tails. The probability of
a heads outcome is 1/2, which will not change.
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Languages are carriers and instruments of thought.
Theoretical prediction outcomes are ultimately expressed
by language. Different views on uncertainty that are embodied
in different religions and theories are also reflected in language.
People often use two types of probabilistic statements to transmit
uncertainty: verbal probability (e.g., possible) and numerical
probability (e.g., 40%). When people perceive uncertainty
as changeable, the selected probability expression (verbal or
numerical) allows for potential changes. In this situation,
verbal probability is more capable of expressing the desired
changeability than numerical probability. Previous studies have
shown that different verbal probabilities can be represented by
membership functions over the numerical [0, 1] probability
interval, which has a location and shape that varies with indi-
viduals and contexts (Wallsten et al., 1986; Weber and Hilton,
1990). For example, a membership function may represent
“possibility” over a numerical probability range of 30–60%,
with 40% as the best point of equivalence that contains the
maximum value (generally one) of the function. However, in
other contexts, both the numerical probability range and the
best point of equivalence can differ. The meanings of verbal
probabilities change according to circumstances, thus allowing
individuals flexibility in expressing changeable uncertainty. In
contrast, when people perceive uncertainty as predetermined
and changeless, the selected probability expression has a stable
and explicit interpretation with insignificant variation. In this
case, numerical probability, which does not satisfy the property
of a changeable membership function, is an ideal expression
because the approach is objective and precise. A previous
study (Windschitl and Wells, 1996) demonstrated that numeric
measures of uncertainty tend to move people toward deliberate
and rule-based thinking. This tendency can increase numerical
probability use when people believe that certain rules prede-
termine uncertainty. The above reasoning process leads to the
following assumptions: verbal probability expression reflects the
“changeable” view of uncertainty, whereas numerical probability
expression reflects the “predetermined and changeless” view of
uncertainty.
A living being is seen as a form of process in the universe. A
living being can maintain its own identity and endure in time
while continuously undergoing change (McCracken, 1952). The
animate is always in motion and exhibits physical and psycho-
logical changes, unlike the inanimate. According to this view,
the recent finding that verbal and numerical probabilities are the
preferred manner of expressing animate and inanimate uncer-
tainties, respectively (Du et al., 2013), can be seen as empirical
evidence to defend our assumptions. Nevertheless, although the
animate/inanimate may serve as proxy measures for change-
able/changeless events, animate/inanimate is not the only repre-
sentation of changeable/changeless. The bidirectional association
between verbal/numerical probabilities and animate/inanimate
uncertainties found in Du et al. (2013) experiments is not about
changeability in general, i.e., animateness is not equated with
changeability. Additional studies are needed to test our assump-
tions about the association between verbal/numerical probabili-
ties and changeable/changeless uncertainties outside the realm of
living vs. nonliving agents.
The bidirectional association reported by Du et al. (2013)
was implemented and observed with explicit assessment proce-
dures. Implicit assessment uses involuntary behavior, which is
more resistant to deliberative control or faking than self-reported
measures (Kim, 2003; Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005), to measure
attitudes about which respondents might be unaware (Greenwald
and Banaji, 1995; Vartanian et al., 2004). Compared to explicit
self-report, Greenwald et al. (1998) believed that implicit assess-
ment, which measures beliefs through indirect or implicit means,
avoids participants’ self-disguise and measures in-depth attitudes
of which people are not aware (Greenwald et al., 1998). Because
the association between probability expression and uncertainty
type is not obvious at the superficial level, we investigated this
association with implicit assessment. Thus, the present study fur-
ther examined associations between probability expression and
uncertainty type by using an implicit assessment procedure.
OVERVIEW
Three studies and a pilot study examined if verbal and numer-
ical probabilities were closely associated with changeable and
changeless uncertainties. In the pilot study, we found that peo-
ple perceive animate objects as changeable and inanimate objects
as changeless. Then, we used an implicit paradigm (i.e., a font
preference task) to test the bidirectional relationship between
verbal/numerical probabilities and changeable/changeless uncer-
tainties in scenarios where the same uncertain event occurred to
animate/inanimate objects (Study 1). We found that verbal prob-
ability was likely to be used to predict the likelihood of events
that affect animate objects but fails to find an association between
inanimate objects and numerical probability. Because Arabic
numerals (e.g., 50%) may not be as favorable as real word charac-
ters (e.g., fifty percent) for the font-type rating task, we modified
the experimental material in Study 1 by replacing the Arabic
numerals with Chinese characters (Study 2). We found that peo-
ple prefer verbal and numerical probability expressions when the
uncertainties are from animate beings and inanimate objects. We
further investigated associations between verbal/numerical prob-
abilities and changeable/changeless uncertainties in scenarios in
which the same uncertain event occurred to the same inani-
mate object but with different changeable situations using the
same implicit task (Study 3). We found that people prefer ver-
bal probability expressions when uncertainties are changeable and
that people prefer numerical probability expressions when uncer-
tainties are changeless. The present study was approved by the
Institutional Review Board of the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences.
PILOT STUDY
Because living things continuously undergo changes (McCracken,
1952), we used animate objects/living things to represent the
perception of changeable uncertainty and inanimate objects to
represent the perception of changeless (or at least less change-
able) uncertainty to test the bidirectional association between
verbal/numerical probabilities and changeable/changeless uncer-
tainties. This manipulation is supported by research on the
distinction between animate and inanimate objects. People
who focus on the psychological properties of animate objects,
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which are usually indeterminate, consider their reactions unpre-
dictable, whereas people who focus on the physical properties
of inanimate objects, which are deterministic, tend to believe
that their reactions are predictable (Gelman and Spelke, 1981).
Furthermore, the pilot study confirmed that participants con-
sider animate objects changeable [93.6% (29/31)] and inani-
mate objects changeless [90.32% (28/31)]. In Study 1, we tested
whether the likelihood of an event happening to animate or inan-
imate objects would be closely related to verbal and numerical
probabilities.
STUDY 1
In this study, participants evaluated the beauty of several font
types in a sentence that described the likelihood of an event
happening to an animate or inanimate object through verbal or
numerical probability expression. Close associations may facili-
tate information processing (as in an Implicit Association Test),
and conceptual processing fluency leads to positive evaluations
(Reber et al., 1998; Lee and Labroo, 2004). Lee and Labroo (2004)
extended the processing fluency model to examine the effect of
conceptual fluency on attitudes, and found that increased percep-
tual fluency leads more favorable attitudes toward a brand among
consumers (Lee and Labroo, 2004). Reber et al. (1998) examined
the effects of perceptual fluency on affective judgments and found
that participants judged targets as prettier if they were preceded
by a matching, rather than nonmatching, prime. Perceptual flu-
ency increases judgments of prettiness and liking (Reber et al.,
1998). Based on this knowledge, we believed that participants in
the font-type rating task would process the sentences of com-
patible objects more fluently and evaluate them as more beau-
tiful compared to the sentences of incompatible objects. Thus,
we hypothesized that if people implicitly believed that change-
able uncertainty was compatible with verbal probability and that
changeless uncertainty was compatible with numerical probabil-
ity, the participant would judge the most beautiful font type in
the sentence by verbal probability in combination with infor-
mation on an animate being (or numerical probability with an
inanimate object). We performed the following experiment to test
this hypothesis.
METHOD
A total of 105 participants completed Study 1 and were com-
pensated with a gift (worth CNY 2.2). The implicit measure
was a font-type rating task (Table 1). Four conditions, person–
verbal (PV), person–numerical (PN), computer–verbal (CV),
and computer–numerical (CN), tested the compatibility between
verbal/numerical probabilities and the uncertainties of ani-
mate/inanimate objects (changeable/changeless uncertainties). In
each condition, a sentence that described the likelihood of an
event occurring to a person or a computer in verbal or numer-
ical probability was printed in 4 different fonts. Participants were
asked to indicate the beauty of each font type on a scale of 74mm,
which was anchored at extremes with the labels “not beautiful
at all” and “extremely beautiful.” The rating was directly trans-
formed into numerical values between 0 and 74. Each participant
evaluated all 4 conditions in an order that was counterbalanced
across participants. This study was a 2× 2 within-subjects design,
with probability expression (verbal, numerical) and uncertainty
type (changeable, changeless) as within-subjects factors.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For each animacy–probability pairing condition, the four ratings
corresponding to the four different font types were combined
into a single variable that represented overall beauty. An ANOVA
was conducted on the newly generated variable with probability
expression and animacy as within-subjects factors. The analy-
sis revealed main effects for probability expression [F(1, 104) =
5.640, p = 0.019, η2 = 0.051] and animacy [F(1, 104) = 4.486,
p = 0.037, η2 = 0.041]. Post-hoc analysis showed that partici-
pants rated the font types in the verbal probability sentences
as more beautiful than the numerical probability sentences and
that participants rated the font types in the chess player sen-
tences as more beautiful than the computer sentences (Figure 1).
However, we did not find an interaction between probability
Table 1 | The four font-type rating task conditions: person-verbal (PV), person-numerical (PN), computer-verbal (CV), and computer-numerical
(CN).
Animacy
Person Computer
Probability expression
Verbal probability
Numerical probability
The English meanings of the four cells are as follows: “the chess player has a good chance to win the game” (PV); “the computer has a good chance to win the
game” (CV); “the chess player has a 70% chance of winning the game” (PN); “the computer has a 70% chance of winning the game” (CN).
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1313 | 3
Wang et al. Probability expression and changeability
expression and animacy. Our results showed that the font type
beauty score for verbal probability expression was higher than
numerical probability expression for both the chess player and
computer sentences. Thus, we did not find that the beauty score
in the CN (computer–numerical) condition was higher than that
in the CV (computer–verbal) condition.
The results provide evidence for our prediction that the ani-
mate being (a person) and verbal probability combination would
be more compatible than the animate being and numerical prob-
ability combination. This result implies that participants implic-
itly associate the uncertainty of the animate being (changeable
uncertainty) with the verbal probability expression. We did not
find that the association between inanimate objects (change-
less uncertainty) and numerical probability is more compati-
ble than the association between inanimate objects and verbal
probability. A post-hoc explanation for this result is that the
font-type rating task may have not worked as well with Arabic
numerals.
In summary, Study 1 provides implicit evidence for our
prediction that verbal probability is more likely to be used
when predicting, describing, and measuring changeable
uncertainty.
FIGURE 1 | Beauty score as a function of probability expression for
person and computer. Error bars denote standard errors.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated an implicit association between verbal
probabilities and animate beings. However, Study 1 failed to find
an association between an inanimate object and numerical prob-
ability. Study 2 was conducted to examine if the failure to detect
Study 1’s computer–numerical compatibility in the font-type rat-
ing task was caused by the use of Arabic numerals. As such, in
Study 2, we modified the experimental material and replaced
Arabic numerals (70%) with Chinese characters (seventy percent
in Chinese).
METHOD
A total of 103 participants completed Study 2 and were com-
pensated with a gift (worth CNY 2.0). The font-type rating task
was also the implicit measure in Study 2. Similar to Study 1, we
designed four conditions (Table 2). In each condition, a sentence
that described the likelihood of an event happening to a per-
son or computer in verbal or numerical probability was printed
in 4 fonts. In contrast to Study 1, all sentences were written in
Chinese characters. Participants were asked to rate the beauty of
each font type on a scale of 74mm. The four conditions in this
study were counterbalanced across participants. This study was a
2 (probability expression)× 2 (uncertainty type) within-subjects
design.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As in Study 1, we summed the rating score corresponding to
the four different font types for each animacy-probability pair-
ing condition, which represented the overall beauty of the font
types for each condition. An ANOVA was conducted with proba-
bility expression and animacy as the within-subjects factors. The
analysis revealed that the main effects of probability expression
and animacy were not significant. However, there was a signif-
icant interaction between probability expression and animacy
[F(1, 102) = 61.533, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.376]. Simple effects anal-
yses indicated that the beauty score in the PV (person–verbal)
condition was significantly higher than the beauty score in the PN
(person–numerical) condition (p < 0.001), whereas the beauty
Table 2 | The four font-type rating task conditions: person-verbal (PV), person-numerical (PN), computer-verbal (CV), and computer-numerical
(CN).
Animacy
Person Computer
Probability expression
Verbal probability
Numerical probability
The English meanings of the four cells are as follows: “the chess player has a good chance to win the game” (PV); “the computer has a good chance to win the
game” (CV); “the chess player has a seventy percent chance of winning the game” (PN); “the computer has a seventy percent chance of winning the game” (CN).
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score in the CN (computer–numerical) condition was signifi-
cantly higher than the beauty score in the CV (computer–verbal)
condition (p < 0.001; Figure 2).
The results of Study 2 provided evidence for our hypothesis
that the combination between an animate being and verbal prob-
ability would be more compatible than the combination between
an animate being and numerical probability. We also found that
the combination between an inanimate object and numerical
probability was more compatible than the combination between
an inanimate object and verbal probability in the scenario that did
not use Arabic numerals. This finding implies that participants
closely associate the uncertainty of animate objects (changeable
uncertainty) with verbal probability expression and that there is
a close relationship between the uncertainty of inanimate objects
(changeless uncertainty) and numerical probability.
In sum, Study 2 provides evidence for our hypothesis about
the verbal probability and animate objects (changeable uncer-
tainty) association and the numerical probability and inanimate
objects (changeless uncertainty) association without using Arabic
numerals. It is worth noting that we used animate/inanimate
objects as proxies of changeability in this study.
STUDY 3
As animate/inanimate is not the only representation of change-
able/changeless, we directly manipulated changeability instead of
using animate/inanimate objects as proxies of changeability to
more broadly test the associations in Study 3. We designed two
“changeability” scenarios: the water (river/pool) scenario and the
die (rolling/settled) scenario. In this study, we asked participants
to evaluate the beauty of various font types in sentences that
described two non-Arabic inanimate scenarios. Table 3 shows the
sentences that described the likelihood that the water level of
a river or pool would rise through verbal or numerical prob-
ability expression. Table 4 shows the sentences that described
the likelihood of obtaining an odd number from a rolling or
settled die through verbal or numerical probability expression.
Rivers flow, whereas pools are still. Furthermore, a rolling die
is full of change, whereas settled dice are stationary. Thus, we
postulated that participants would judge the most beautiful sen-
tence font types by verbal probability in combination with the
river/rolling die (or numerical probability with a pool/settled
FIGURE 2 | Beauty score as a function of probability expression for
person and computer. Error bars denote standard errors.
die). We performed the following experiment to test this
hypothesis.
METHOD
A total of 97 participants completed Study 3 and were com-
pensated with a gift (worth CNY 3.8). The implicit measure for
Study 3 was the font-type rating task. For the water scenario,
we designed four conditions: river–verbal (RV), river–numerical
(RN), pool–verbal (PV), and pool–numerical (PN; Table 3).
Additional 4 conditions were designed for the die scenario to
test the compatibility between verbal/numerical probabilities
and changeable/changeless uncertainties: rolling die–verbal (RV),
rolling die–numerical (RN), settled die–verbal (SV), and settled
die–numerical (SN; Table 4). For each condition, there was a sen-
tence that described the likelihood of an event happening to the
4 objects (river/pool and rolling/settled die) in verbal or numer-
ical probability, which was printed in 4 fonts. Similar to the two
former studies, we asked participants to rate the beauty of each
font type on a scale of 74mm. The four conditions for each sce-
nario were counterbalanced across participants. This study was a
2 (probability expression)× 2 (uncertainty type) within-subjects
design.We also asked participants to evaluate the degree of change
of the river/pool and rolling/settled die on a 7-point Likert scale
(1= “very little,” 7= “very large”) after the font-type rating task.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Paired-sample t-tests showed that participants judged the river
as significantly more changeable than the pool [Mriver = 4.90;
Mpool = 3.08; t(95) = 9.697, p < 0.001] and that the rolling
die was significantly more changeable than the settled die
[Mrolling die = 5.46; Msettled die = 3.32; t(96) = 8.365, p < 0.001].
This result was in line with our hypothesis.
For the font-type rating task, we summed the rating score
that corresponded to the four different font types for each
changeability-probability pairing condition, which represented
the overall beauty of the font type for each condition. Thereafter,
an ANOVA was conducted for each scenario with probability
expression and changeability as within-subjects factors. The anal-
ysis revealed that the probability expression and changeability in
both scenarios had no main effects. There were significant inter-
actions between probability expression and changeability for the
water scenario [F(1, 96) = 11.264, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.105] and the
die scenario [F(1, 96) = 7.681, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.074] (Figure 3).
In the water scenario, a simple effects analysis indicated that
the beauty score in the RV (river–verbal) condition was signifi-
cantly higher than the beauty score in the RN (river–numerical)
condition (p = 0.002), while the beauty score in the PN (pool–
numerical) condition was significantly higher than the beauty
score in the PV (pool–verbal) condition (p = 0.046; Figure 3A).
Similar results were found for the die scenario, i.e., the beauty
score in the RV (rolling die–verbal) condition was significantly
higher than the beauty score in the RN (rolling die–numerical)
condition (p = 0.038), while the beauty score in the SN (set-
tled die–numerical) condition was significantly higher than the
beauty score in the SV (settled die–verbal) condition (p = 0.017;
Figure 3B). The sentences in the die scenario received higher
beauty scores than those in the water scenario. This may be
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Table 3 | The four font-type rating task conditions: river-verbal (RV), river-numerical (RN), pool-verbal (PV), and pool-numerical (PN).
Water
River Pool
Probability expression
Verbal probability
Numerical probability
The English meanings for the four cells are as follows: “the water level of a river may rise” (RV); “the water level of a pool may rise” (PV); “the water level of a river
has a sixty percent chance of rising” (RN); “the water level of a pool has a sixty percent chance of rising” (PN).
Table 4 | The four font-type rating task conditions: rolling die-verbal (RV), rolling die-numerical (RN), settled die-verbal (SV), and settled
die-numerical (SN).
Die
Rolling die Settled die
Probability expression
Verbal probability
Numerical probability
The English meanings of the four cells are as follows: “an odd number can be obtained for a rolling die” (RV); “an odd number can be obtained for a settled die”
(SV); “an odd number has a one-half chance of appearing for a rolling die” (RN); “an odd number has a one-half chance of appearing for a settled die” (SN).
because different font types were used in the two scenarios, as
shown in Tables 3, 4.
The results from Study 3 provided evidence for our hypothesis
that the combination between a changeable object (a river/rolling
die) and verbal probability would be more compatible than the
combination between a changeable object and numerical proba-
bility. We also found that the combination between a changeless
object (a pool/settled die) and numerical probability was more
compatible than the combination between a changeless object
and verbal probability in scenarios that did not use Arabic numer-
als. This finding implies that participants associate changeable
uncertainty with verbal probability expressions and that the asso-
ciation between changeless uncertainty and numerical probability
is robust.
Study 3 provides evidence for our prediction on the
verbal probability and changeable uncertainty association
and the numerical probability and changeless uncertainty
association in the two scenarios that do not utilize living
agents.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We investigated the associations between verbal/numerical proba-
bilities and changeable/changeless uncertainties by using implicit
assessments. The results of the three studies demonstrate that
people closely associate verbal probabilities with changeable
uncertainty and that people closely associate numerical prob-
abilities with changeless uncertainty. Our findings suggest that
changeability may serve as an additional semantic feature of
verbal probability.
People use verbal probability more often than numerical prob-
ability in daily life (Budescu et al., 1988). Since the 1960s, the
features of verbal probability have been intensely studied to
examine its role and efficacy in communicating uncertainty and
decision-making. Previous studies have identified three semantic
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FIGURE 3 | Beauty score as a function of probability expression for
objects with different changeability in the water scenario (A) and the
die scenario (B). Error bars denote standard errors.
features of verbal probability, which convey additional semantic
information. One feature is directionality. Most verbal probabil-
ities are unidirectional and fall into one of two types: positive
(suggesting the occurrence of a described outcome; e.g., possi-
ble) and negative (drawing attention to its nonoccurrence; e.g.,
impossible; Teigen and Brun, 1999, 2000; Juanchich et al., 2010,
2013). From the directional perspective, numerical probabilities
are more equivocal than verbal phrases because the directional
trend of a numerical probability is undefined. The second feature
is internal/external attribution. The internal/external attribution
of uncertainty can be distinguished when verbal probabilities
are placed in different syntactical structures: “I am uncertain. . . ”
reflects uncertainty that is attributed to one’s state of knowl-
edge, whereas “It is uncertain. . . ” reflects uncertainty that is
attributable to the external world (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982).
Fox and Irwin (1998) suggested that the use of internal expres-
sions of uncertainty triggers more certitude and responsibility
than the use of external expressions. The final feature is self-
serving interpretation. When using verbal probabilities to describe
the likelihood of events in one’s own future or the future of oth-
ers, people interpret verbal chance in a self-servingmanner (Smits
and Hoorens, 2005). Thus, people will believe that positive events
are more likely than negative events to occur in their own futures
compared to the future of others, despite probability descrip-
tions being the same. As the Zhen ( ) Hexagram in I Ching
states, “thunders do not hurt him, but his neighbor had error”
(Wang and Ren, 1993). These three features demonstrate that
verbal probability is not just another way of expressing a quan-
titative probability, but is also a carrier that conveys important
semantic information. The current research contributes to this
literature by detecting an additional semantic feature for verbal
probability, namely, “changeability,” which describes the change-
able nature of verbal probability. According to our results, verbal
probability is useful for describing largely changeable uncertainty,
whereas numerical probability, which has an “unchangeable” fea-
ture, is suitable for describing relatively changeless uncertainty.
To the best of our knowledge, this changeability feature of verbal
probability is reported in this paper for the first time in the field
of uncertainty communication.
The compatibility between verbal probability and animate
beings/changeable objects has been confirmed even with implicit
measures. Previous studies have investigated the association
between animate/inanimate uncertainties and verbal/numerical
probabilities using explicit procedures (Du et al., 2013). In the
present study, we examined the relationship between uncertainty
type and probability expression using implicit procedures. We did
not use animate and inanimate objects as proxies for change-
ability, but instead directly manipulated changeability. Previous
studies that have examined the animate–inanimate distinction
have found that people often focus on the psychological proper-
ties of animate objects, which are indeterminate and varying, and
on the physical properties of inanimate things, which are fixed
(Gelman and Spelke, 1981). From this perspective, the distinc-
tion between animate and inanimate on changeability is apparent.
Our pilot study also shows this difference. To an extent, animate
and inanimate objects may be used as proxies for changeable and
changeless events and the verbal probability of animate objects
can further be generalized as a welcome and proper mode for
communicating uncertainty in situations that are full of poten-
tial changes or variations. Furthermore, our study found a robust
association between verbal/numerical probabilities and change-
able/changeless uncertainties in the field of inanimate objects.
Thus, changeability can describe and contrast a variety of objects
outside the realm of living vs. nonliving agents. This finding sug-
gests that the verbal probability–changeable uncertainty combi-
nation is automatic, well ingrained, and can significantly increase
the positive evaluation of an irrelevant stimulus, such as font
type. This study was a preliminary exploration of the associa-
tions between probability expression and uncertainty type. There
may be additional factors that affect these findings in real-life set-
tings. Future research is needed to test and verify the mechanisms
between probability expression and uncertainty type.
It is important to consider several additional points. First, the
primary purpose of this research was to examine if verbal proba-
bility is suited to describing changeable uncertainty and if numer-
ical probability is suited to describing changeless uncertainty.
This study directly manipulated animacy (animate/inanimate)
and the changeable degree of inanimate objects. Future research
may be able to manipulate other variables to further confirm our
findings. Second, we did not examine the effect of appropriate
communication modes on decision-making quality. Our study
indicates that compatible (e.g., verbal-changeable uncertainty)
combinations have a positive influence on the evaluation of font
types. This effect may be caused by conceptual processing fluency
(Lee and Labroo, 2004), which may affect the desirability of alter-
natives with uncertain outcomes in decision making. This topic is
an important avenue for future research.
We live in a world of rapid change. According to the Greek
philosopher Heraclitus, “everything changes and nothing remains
still.” In this study, we found that verbal probability possesses a
semantic feature, which we named changeability. This suggests
that verbal probability is responsible for predicting changeable
uncertainty. We were also able to identify a good match between
the changeability feature and the changing nature of the real
world. Verbal probability plays an important role in describ-
ing the changing world, regardless of whether the changeability
feature is supported. This result may be used to explain the pop-
ular use of verbal probability in daily life (Wallsten et al., 1986;
Budescu et al., 1988; Reagan et al., 1989) and the limited role of
numerical probability in conveying scientific information to the
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public (with the exception of gene science and weather forecast-
ing fields, wherein numerical probability is common). Therefore,
although changeability is a late addition to the group of verbal
probability features, it is not a simple accumulation of termi-
nology. Changeability is important for enabling researchers and
practitioners to understand how people react or adapt to a chang-
ing world. Research should continue to examine this topic to
clarify its effects on decision-making under risk and uncertainty
conditions. Also, people are known to make large errors when
adapting their probability estimates to changes in the situation
(e.g., Shaklee and Fischhoff, 1990; Yechiam and Budescu, 2006).
Future studies could examine if these errors may be alleviated by
the use of verbal descriptions of likelihood.
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